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We investigate a repeated two-player game setting where the col-
umn player is also a designer of the system, and has full control over
payoff matrices. In addition, we assume that the row player uses a
no-regret algorithm to efficiently learn how to adapt their strategy
to the column player’s behaviour over time. The goal of the col-
umn player is to guide her opponent into picking a mixed strategy
which is preferred by the system designer. Therefore, she needs to:
(i) design appropriate payoffs for both players; and (ii) strategically
interact with the row player during a sequence of plays in order
to guide her opponent to converge to the desired mixed strategy.
To design appropriate payoffs, we propose a novel zero-sum game
construction whose unique minimax solution contains the desired
behaviour. We also propose another construction in which only the
minimax strategy of the row player is unique. Finally, we propose
a new game playing algorithm for the system designer and show
that it can guide the row player to its minimax strategy, under the
assumption that the row player adopts a stable no-regret algorithm.
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1 INTRODUCTION
We consider a repeated two-player game setting, in which one
player (say the column player) is also a designer of the system (i.e.,
she can design the payoffs for both players), and her opponent (the
row player) is a strategic utility maximiser, who can efficiently learn
to adapt their strategy to the column player’s behaviour over time
in order to achieve good total payoff. The goal of the column player
is to guide her opponent into selecting a mixed strategy which
is favourable for the system designer. In particular, she needs to
achieve this by: (i) designing appropriate payoffs for both players;
and (ii) strategically interacting with the row player during a se-
quence of plays in order to ensure her opponent converges to the
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desired behaviour. In this paper, we propose an approach for solv-
ing this problem, which consists of two components corresponding
to (i) and (ii) respectively:
Games with a unique minimax solution. To begin, the sys-
tem designer must decide upon the payoffs for both players. For
two-player zero-sum games, it is well known that, in the full infor-
mation setting, the best payoff rational players can attain is their
payoff at any minimax equilibrium. [2]. Thus, a natural idea is to
construct a zero-sum game, 𝐴 , in which the only minimax strat-
egy available to the row player is the desired behaviour. In doing
so, the system designer can hope that any reasonable player will
eventually begin to play their minimax strategy, and thus adopt the
desired behaviour. Construction of games with unique equilibrium
solutions is a long running problem within the literature, beginning
with the seminal work of Shapley, Karlin, and Bohnenblust [1]. In
this work, we aim to provide zero-sum game constructions which
offer the system designer more flexibility in terms of the payoff
matrix they choose. Such flexibility may be useful when enforcing
system payoffs correspond to costly real world actions.
Last round convergence in zero-sum games. Once a zero-
game has been chosen, the system designer must strategically incen-
tivise the row player to converge to the desired behaviour through
repeated play. Recall that, if both players commit to a no-regret
algorithm at each phase of play, then payoffs will converge in expec-
tation to the value of the game. Additionally, during this process, no
exchange of information takes place, as both players require only
the payoffs they observe in order to update their strategies [2, 6].
As a result, one may hope that, by adopting a no-regret algorithm,
the system designer can naturally guide the row player to their
minimax strategy. Unfortunately, convergence of average payoffs,
in general, does not imply convergence in strategies [7]. This is-
sue is known as the last round convergence problem in the online
learning literature, and has recently attracted a good amount of
attention [3–5]. In what follows, we propose a novel no-regret al-
gorithm which leverages the information advantage of the system
designer to guide the row player to its minimax strategy over time,
under a mild set of assumptions.
For the remainder, we will describe each component of our ap-
proach in more detail, beginning with the construction of zero-sum
games with unique minimax equilibria.
2 DESIGNING GAMES WITH A UNIQUE
MINIMAX SOLUTION
Without loss of generality, suppose there exists a preferred strategy,
y∗, that the column player would like to play whilst at a minimax
equilibrium. That is, the column player wishes not only to ensure
that the row player’s minimax strategy is x∗, but also that their
own minimax strategy is y∗. Under this assumption, we observe
that the strategy pair (x∗, y∗) must form a minimax equilibrium
of 𝐴. Moreover, as previously mentioned, x∗ must be the unique
minimax strategy for the row player.
In order to satisfy both conditions, the support of y∗ must be
greater than equal to the support of x∗. For if this is not the case,
then it is provably impossible to construct a matrix𝐴 with minimax
equilibrium (x∗, y∗) whilst guaranteeing the uniqueness of the
minimax strategy x∗ [1]. From now on, without loss of generality,
we shall assume that for any strategy with support 𝑘 , that the first
𝑘 entries are nonzero.
If the support of y∗ is greater than the support of x∗, then we
construct 𝐴 according to Theorem 1. The other case, in which the
support of y∗ is equal to the support of x∗ is dealt with in the
full version of the paper. Note that, in both theorems, y∗ is not
necessarily the unique minimax strategy for the column player,
whilst x∗ is the unique minimax strategy for the row player.
Theorem 1. Let x ∈ Δ𝑛 , y ∈ Δ𝑚 such that 𝑘 = 𝑠𝑢𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡 (x) < 𝑙 =
𝑠𝑢𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡 (y). Let the matrix 𝐴 be of the form
𝐴 =

𝑎1 𝛼2 ... 𝛼𝑘 𝛽1 ... 𝛽1
𝛼1 𝑎2 ... 𝛼𝑘 𝛽2 ... 𝛽2
... ... ... ...
𝛼1 𝛼2 ... 𝑎𝑘 𝛽𝑘 ... 𝛽𝑘
𝛼1 − 𝑧 𝛼2 − 𝑧 ... 𝛼𝑘 − 𝑧 𝑣 ... 𝑣
... ... ... ...
𝛼1 − 𝑧 𝛼2 − 𝑧 ... 𝛼𝑘 − 𝑧 𝑣 ... 𝑣

where the parameters of 𝐴 satisfy
0 < 𝑣1 < 𝑣𝑦, 𝑦 =
𝑙∑
𝑖=𝑘+1




𝛽𝑖 = 𝑣, 𝛼𝑖 = 𝑣 +
𝑥𝑖 (𝑣𝑦 − 𝑣1)
y𝑖
, 𝑎𝑖 = 𝛼𝑖 −
𝑣𝑦 − 𝑣1
y𝑖
∀𝑖 ∈ [𝑘] .
then x is the unique minimax strategy for the row player in the zero-
sum game described by 𝐴.
In Theorem 1, the parameters 𝑎𝑖 and 𝑧 ensure that x is the unique
minimax strategy for the row player, even in the case where the
support of x is less than𝑛. Meanwhile, the parameters 𝛽𝑖 ensure that
y is a minimax strategy for the column player. Lastly, the parameter
𝛾 ensures that all entries of 𝐴 are nonnegative (although this is not
strictly required).
3 LAST ROUND CONVERGENCE IN
TWO-PLAYER ZERO-SUM GAMES
Next, given a matrix 𝐴, as constructed in the previous section, we
investigate how the system designer can guide the row player to its
minimax strategy, under the assumption that the row player uses a
no-regret algorithm.
Firstly, we show that a naïve approach, namely to repeatedly
playing y∗, will not always lead to the desired last round conver-
gence (i.e., the row player will converge to x∗):
Claim 2. If 𝑠𝑢𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡 (x) > 1 , then there is no guarantee that if
the column player repeatedly plays y∗, the row player will eventually
converge to x∗.
Given this result, we need to design a different game playing
policy for the column player. More specifically, we require a policy
which actively exploits the information advantage possessed by the
column player. The LRCA algorithm, originally proposed by Dinh et
al. [5], was designed with this goal in mind. On odd rounds, LRCA
selects the minimax strategy in order to stabilise the trajectory
of both players. Meanwhile, in even rounds, the LRCA algorithm
exploits any weaknesses in the row player’s strategy by moving in
the direction of the highest payoff strategy in the previous round,
where the rate of moving depends on how far the row player’s
strategy from the Nash equilibrium (i.e., 𝑓 (𝑥𝑡−1) − 𝑣). The LRCA
algorithm guarantees last round convergence (for both players)
against a number of popular no-regret algorithms including the
multiplicative weight update algorithm, online mirror descent, and
the linear multiplicative weight update algorithm.
LRCA is described in detail by Algorithm 1 below:
Algorithm 1: Last Round Convergence with Asymmetry
(LRCA) algorithm
Input: Current iteration 𝑡 , past feedback 𝑥⊤
𝑡−1𝐴 of the row
player, minimax strategy 𝑦∗ and value 𝑣 of the game.
Output: Strategy 𝑦𝑡 for the column player
if 𝑡 = 2𝑘 − 1, 𝑘 ∈ N then
𝑦𝑡 = 𝑦
∗
if 𝑡 = 2𝑘, 𝑘 ∈ N then
𝑒𝑡 := argmax𝑒∈{𝑒1,𝑒2,...𝑒𝑚 } 𝑥
⊤
𝑡−1𝐴𝑒
𝑓 (𝑥𝑡−1) := max𝑦∈Δ𝑚 𝑥⊤𝑡−1𝐴𝑦; 𝛼𝑡 :=
𝑓 (𝑥𝑡−1)−𝑣
max( 𝑛4 ,2)
𝑦𝑡 := (1 − 𝛼𝑡 )𝑦∗ + 𝛼𝑡𝑒𝑡
More generally, we prove that LRCA also guarantees last round
convergence when paired with any no-regret algorithm, as long
as this no-regret algorithm possesses the “stability" property, as
defined below:
Definition 3. A no-regret algorithm is stable if ∀𝑡 : y𝑡 = y∗ =⇒
x𝑡+1 = x𝑡 .
Note that a wide range of no-regret algorithms adhere to this
property. For example, the class of Follow the Regularised Leader
algorithms are stable. A proof of this fact is given in the full paper.
Theorem 4. Assume that the row player follows a stable no-regret
algorithm and 𝑛 is the dimension of the row player’s strategy. Then,
by following LRCA, for any 𝜖 > 0, there exists 𝑙 ∈ N such that
R𝑙
𝑙
= O( 𝜖2𝑛 ) and 𝑓 (x𝑙 ) − 𝑣 ≤ 𝜖 .
Note that (x𝑙 , y∗) are 𝜖-Nash equilibria. For no-regret algorithms
with the optimal regret bound R𝑙 = O(𝑙
1
2 ), Theorem 4 guarantees





rounds. Thus, LRCA is successful in guiding the row player
towards the desired behaviour, as long as the row player adopts a
stable no-regret algorithm.
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